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ABSTRACT
Win Shares & Rookie Contracts in the NBA
Lucas R. Kobat
Director: Mike Allgrunn, Ph.D.
This paper examines the relationship between the win share statistic and
compensation in the National Basketball Association (NBA) by using data from eighteen
draft classes from 1989 to 2006. The research shows that players are generally
compensated in accordance with their production, unless bound by a rookie contract.
Historically, players under a rookie contract have win share production that exceeds their
compensation level. Therefore, in-game statistics are examined, using both collegiate and
NBA data to determine whether win share production can be predicted before a player
enters the NBA. Collegiate data does not prove to be a sound indicator of professional
level win-shares, but in-game statistics do seem to be a good predictor of win-shares
when NBA data is used. Ultimately, win share regression is beneficial for NBA
organizations making rookie contract decisions (i.e. team options) for players that have
been drafted, but further research would be needed to determine which players to draft.
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Preface
This paper seeks to use regression analysis and other statistical methods to
understand the relationship between the individual contribution of players in the National
Basketball Association (NBA) and their compensation. Ultimately, the research aims to
develop a methodology for rookie contract decisions. Organizations take risk when they
draft players, and risk/reward analysis must be completed to assess whether or not it is
beneficial for organizations to exercise team options and continue to compensate prior
draft selections.
NBA organizations, at the end of the day, are firms that care about profit margins.
While much of the literature attempts to capture marginal revenue per player through
various methods, this research discusses individual player contribution as it relates to
wins, disregarding intangible factors that may indirectly impact team revenues, such as
personal brand. Forecasting brand affinity for a particular player is less reliable due to
myriad variables that lie outside the realm of basketball, whereas win contribution is a
direct impact to the success or failure of a player’s respective team.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

A Brief Argument For the Importance of Wins
The research in this paper hinges on the assumption that additional wins are the
most economically beneficial variable to organizations in the NBA. Therefore, additional
wins will be viewed as the root cause of success for NBA teams. Essentially, more
regular season wins result in an increased chance of winning an NBA championship;
increasing team monetary value.
Over the time period of 1989 to 2006, teams that either had the most wins in the
Eastern Conference or Western Conference won the NBA championship 56% of the time.
For championship winners, the average number of wins over this time period was sixty.
Sixty wins equates to roughly 73% of games played in a regular season, as every team
plays eighty-two games each year. Since teams need to win 73% of their regular season
games to win an NBA championship, wins seem to be highly important to team success.
Why do teams care about winning championships? The impact of championships on both
short-term and long-term growth of team monetary value is substantial and shows why
teams should care about winning the NBA championship. For example, the winner of the
NBA championship in 2017 was the Golden State Warriors. Their current value is $2.6
billion, but the important statistic to note is the 37% one-year growth they experienced
after winning the championship. In fact, this growth rate was 1.31 times more than the
second highest growth rate at 16%. This short-term growth is not atypical of NBA
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champions. The Cleveland Cavaliers, after winning their first championship in franchise
history, grew their team monetary value by 78% from $515 million in 2014 to $915
million in 2015.
Long-term growth also accompanies teams that are perennially successful in the
post-season. As of 2017, four of the top five most valuable teams were also in the group
of five teams with the most championships wins. In fact, the New York Knicks were the
only team to be in the top five most valuable, but not the top five most championship
wins. However, if NBA championship appearances were used in lieu of championship
wins, all top five most valuable teams would also be in the group of five teams with most
NBA finals appearances.
As has been stated, regular season wins are a strong determinant of both NBA
championship winners and teams that make the NBA finals. Additionally, teams that win
the NBA championship experience a substantial short-term growth in monetary value,
and teams that have historically been successful in the post-season experience long-term
growth in monetary value. Therefore, NBA organizations should be interested in finding
players that positively impact their yearly win total. To maximize their probability of
growing monetary value, NBA teams should not only locate players with positive win
contributions, but also players that do not carry a heavy payroll expense.
This paper sought to find players with positive win contributions and minimal payroll
burdens. Finally, the research aimed to create a comprehensive methodology for
predicting win contribution levels both pre-draft and post-draft, which can aide NBA
organizations in rookie contract decisions.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review

Dr. Thaler & Dr. Massey – The NFL Draft
The inspiration for this research was largely based on the work of Dr. Richard
Thaler of the University of Chicago and Dr. Cade Massey of the University of
Pennsylvania. The work of Dr. Thaler and Dr. Massey involved studying the efficient
market hypothesis in the National Football League (NFL).
The duo used their data set to examine value of NFL players over their career.
They used certain variables to capture “value” including the amount of starts, Pro Bowl
selections, and yearly compensation. Player positions were also used in the performance
evaluation (Massey & Thaler, 2013).
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Figure 1 illustrates value per season for all player positions measured in millions
of US dollars:
Figure 1 - Massey & Thaler Value Per Season

Clearly, quarterbacks are more valuable in the NFL marketplace than other
positions, and increasingly more so as they become more successful. For example, a
quarterback who starts fourteen or more games in one season is worth roughly $8 million
dollars. However, if that quarterback is also “All pro”, their value jumps to just shy of
$14 million dollars, which is roughly a 75% increase.
This examination of value is precisely the research this paper seeks to conduct,
but through win contribution levels, taking the above method a step further by examining
individual performance and the correlation to team wins generated. This expansion of the
work done by Dr. Massey and Dr. Thaler allows for varying monetary values to be
assigned to players according to their predicted win contribution.
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An Explanation of Win Shares
Basketball is a fluid, fast-paced game with five individuals executing a variety of
tasks simultaneously to produce the end product of points. This paper seeks to assign
win-contribution levels to individual players. The concept of individual win-contribution
is not completely new, and several sports sabermetricians have developed their own
models.
The first to ever develop a win-contribution, or win share, model was Bill James.
James, who currently works for the Boston Red Sox as Senior Baseball Operations
Advisor, began his work on advanced baseball statistics in the 1970’s. Known as the
pioneer of the sabermetric field, James became better known for The Bill James Baseball
Abstract, in which he discussed the concept of win shares, along with many other ways of
modeling Major League Baseball performance. His model assigns three win shares to
every team per one win they produce, most likely to make the results easier to
comprehend as most players (at least in the NBA) have sub-one win shares per season.
The model works on an individual level as well as a team level. This paper is interested in
win shares produced at the individual level, but for example purposes the model will be
examined at the team level.
The Chicago Cubs in 2004 won 89 games. For Bill James’ model to be accurate,
the output should roughly equate to 89 games. The underlying mathematics of the model
deal with marginal runs scored and marginal runs saved. The margin is defined as half of
the league average runs scored and half the league runs allowed by batters and pitchers
respectively. To calculate marginal runs scored for the Cubs, one must take the league
margin in 2004 of 376 runs scored and subtract it from the runs scored by Chicago (789).
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Then take the difference of the league margin in 2004 for runs allowed (1127) and runs
allowed by Chicago (665). Both of these calculations work out to 413 hitting runs and
462 pitching runs. The combination of these figures equals 875 marginal runs for the
Chicago Cubs in 2004. The 875 marginal runs are divided by twice the amount of league
average runs in 2004 (1502), which produces an expected win-percentage of 58.2% or 94
wins. Since the 2004 Chicago Cubs won 89 games, the error is 1.05%.
The Sports-Reference Model
Workers at Sports-Reference.com, who focus on compiling data for professional
and collegiate sports leagues, developed the win-share model used for this research. The
model is specific to the NBA and deviates from the model developed by Bill James in
two ways. First, it sets one win share equal to one team win, whereas Bill James’ model
set one win equal to three win shares. Second, the Sports-Reference model allows for
negative win shares, which was avoided in Bill James’ model with the lowest possible
win share figure being zero. These two key distinctions improve the win share model by
allowing direct comparisons of win contribution levels of individuals on a given roster
and the team’s win total. It also more realistically captures the notion that a player’s
performance could indeed hurt team performance to the extent that his win-contribution
inhibits the win shares generated by his teammates.
Other NBA Prediction Models
This paper recognizes the magnitude of importance for the topic it examines, as
the NBA is comprised of billion dollar organizations that have million dollar payrolls.
Therefore, this research is not a final solution to predicting NBA player performance.
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However, it does differentiate itself by taking a more focused approach in addressing the
team option dilemma found within rookie contracts.
FiveThirtyEight’s CARMELO
Most recently, writers at statistics publication FiveThirtyEight attempted to create
a career projection tool named CARMELO. This model took player ratings like true
shooting percentage and plus/minus scores, along with WAR (wins above replacement)
to find similar historical players to the player being analyzed. Then, using the historical
data of players most similar to the player in question, a ranged projected performance
was calculated for statistics of interest like minutes played and WAR.
While the depth of the study is interesting, the breadth is limited with CARMELO
ratings available solely for players who played at least 100 minutes in the 2014-2015
season or at least 250 minutes in the 2013-2014 season. In contrast, the research for this
paper culminated statistics spanning eighteen draft classes from 1989 to 2006.
In terms of predicting win production, the CARMELO model only projects a
ranged WAR based on similar players. First, WAR is valuable as a comparison tool, but
not as an absolute figure. The statistic cannot cleanly be converted into actual wins;
therefore it is not helpful in discerning individual win contribution. While WAR may be
helpful when making certain roster decisions, win shares are most useful when
attempting to predict win production levels because the statistic is tied to actual win
results and not an arbitrary baseline.
Finally, as stated by the developers of the model, there is bias in the simulation as
CARMELO favors certain players and does not have adequate data to compare others,
such as Golden State Warriors standout Steph Curry. Curry’s style of play is so unique
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that historical comparisons are merely a poor man’s version of his performance, thus
underweighting career projections (Silver & Paine, 2015).
Coates & Oguntimein Model
Coates & Oguntimein examined the effects of college statistics on NBA draft
position. Their paper, published in the North American Association of Sports Economists,
specifically looked at in-game collegiate statistics and whether the player was in a big or
small conference during college. The duo then looked at the correlation between college
performance and NBA performance at the career level and bifurcated the data by big and
small conference players.
Their paper found that college statistics can be an indicator of NBA career
success and that NBA organizations tend to commit more to early picks than late picks,
which is possibly due to “escalation of commitment” bias. This discovery is important
insight into team decisions regarding rookie contracts because it shows that players
drafted earlier may receive undeserved contract extensions. For example, Kwame Brown
(considered one of the major busts in draft history) kept his spot on the Washington
Wizards roster for the first four years of his career. However, Coates & Oguntimein do
not evaluate production at the individual level, nor do they examine whether NBA teams
could solve the escalation of commitment issue by attempting to predict win share levels
for team option years of the rookie contract (Coates & Oguntimein, 2008).
Greene’s PER & Win Share Analysis
Alexander Greene, while conducting graduate research at St. Cloud State,
published a paper quite similar to the research found in this thesis. Greene examined the
effect of college statistics on draft position and rookie statistics on career performance.
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The research focused on PER (Player Efficiency Rating) and win shares as end points of
the study. As noted in Greene’s paper, PER is not the most well rounded statistic, as it
does not concretely attribute wins to individual players. Greene concluded that college
statistics were good indicators of draft position and that rookie PER and rookie win
shares were sound indicators of career performance.
Greene also used a similar data set, incorporating draft classes from 1985 to 2005
so that players drafted in the latter portion of the data set would have full career
observations. Whether or not drafts pre-1989 should be intermingled with drafts post1989 is a possible discussion point as 1989 was the implementation year for the modern
draft lottery system. Additionally, Greene does not examine the nuance of the rookie
contract and the team options that occur in years three and four. While taking similar
initial steps, Greene’s “The Success of NBA Draft Picks: Can College Careers Predict
NBA Winners?” does not extend to the decision point faced by NBA organizations,
which is simply whether or not a player should be kept after the second year of his rookie
contract (Greene, 2015).
The NBA Draft
NBA Draft
The NBA draft dates back to 1947. The event encompasses the selection of
college and foreign prospects by NBA franchises. Considerable amounts of resources are
allocated to scouting incoming talent during their college or foreign careers. The modern
NBA draft began in 1989 and reformed the process to include two rounds with a fixed
draft order. NBA teams have the opportunity to add new talent to their respective rosters
through the draft, which is one of only three opportunities to accomplish such a feat. The
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other two opportunities are through trades and free agency, both of which are more
capital intensive than the draft (NBA Draft Rules, 2017).
NBA Draft Lottery
The first fourteen picks of the NBA draft are referred to as the lottery. Rights to
draft at these positions are determined by a weighted Ping-Pong ball selection.
Methodology relating to the amount of the weights and selection process has varied over
time, but the framework has been consistent. Whichever team recorded the worst record
the previous season is given the greatest weight in the lottery (currently measured by the
count of Ping-Pong balls in the selection pool). The earliest versions of the draft lottery
originate in 1985 with the modern system being implemented for the 1989-1990 season.
The importance of the draft lottery is seen in trade behavior by NBA front offices that
regularly attempt to “move up” into the lottery section of the draft in order to acquire
better talent compared to the talent available in the remaining pool of players (Dengate,
2005).
NBA Rookie Contracts
Rookie contracts are two years in length, with a team-based option for a third year
that may be exercised at the end of a player’s rookie season until the following October
31st. If the team exercises their option for a third year, they are also entitled to an option
for a fourth year. This option may be exercised from the completion of a player’s second
season to the following October 31st. Following the potential four years of a rookie
contract, teams may extend qualifying offers to rookies, who at this point are considered
restricted free agents (Jessop, 2012). Essentially, this restriction means that a player’s
current team has first mover advantage in offering a long-term contract.
12

Agents have little room to negotiate rookie contracts as they adhere to a strict
salary scale. Compensation is dictated by the position a player is selected in the draft.
However, under the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA) rookie salaries can
fall within 80-120% of what the scale dictates. Typically, players selected in the first
round (certainly within the lottery) command the 20% premium (Jessop, 2012).
Joshi Analysis
Nikhil Joshi, during his time at Stanford University, conducted research to
determine whether top draft picks were overpaid compared to players drafted later. He
concluded that rookies are roughly paid one quarter of what they would be worth in an
open free-agent market. While not beneficial to the player, it does open the opportunity
for NBA organizations to maximize production per payroll costs by performing well in
the draft. Joshi attempts to capture marginal revenue per player to determine value,
whereas this paper uses win shares that are dictated by actual in-game performance.
Marginal revenue per player is a method that is widely used in the literature for
comparing compensation, but it does not do a good job of determining when players are
undervalued, which is why this paper chose to use win shares as its method of
determining player value (Joshi, 2011).
Scouting Dilemmas
As has been discussed, the NBA draft is an opportunity for teams to add talent to
their rosters without spending large amounts of capital. Due to the importance of this
opportunity, NBA organizations place great emphasis on gauging the talent of incoming
prospects through scouting. Yet, this method is not a perfect science.
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One way NBA teams learn about incoming talent is through an organized event
called the NBA Combine. This combine sheds light on a prospect’s ability by measuring
certain factors that effect performance such as bench press, vertical jump, and three
quarter court sprint time. Additionally, physical characteristics like height, weight, and
wingspan are recorded during the combine (Wasserman, 2017).
Teams also hire scouts to watch live and recorded performances of college and
foreign prospects. Scouts usually come to a general consensus on players that will have
the greatest impact in the NBA. However, this process has fallen victim to blatant misses
over the years. Michael Jordan, considered to be one of the best players of all time, was
drafted third overall in 1984 behind Hakeem Olajuwon and Sam Bowie. Olajuwon,
although a two-time NBA champion, only found post-season success during the timespan
that Jordan was away from basketball, pursuing baseball ambitions (Biography.com,
2016). Bowie, considered one of the greatest draft busts in NBA history, never won an
NBA championship (Schoenfield, 1996).
A more recent and glaring example would be Draymond Green. Green is
considered to be the prototypical “big-man” in the current small-ball era of the NBA.
However, in 2012 Green fell to the 35th pick of the second round. There is no evidence to
suggest that Draymond’s game transcended significantly from the end of his college
career to 2015, when Green was a main contributor to the Golden State Warrior’s
championship run. In hindsight, experts agree that the sole reason Green was not drafted
higher was because scouts could not decide what position he was best suited for in the
NBA (Titus, 2017). This scouting bias is the exact error that this research aims to help
alleviate through analysis of advanced metrics.
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Rating Agencies
Currently, rating agencies (as exist for high school prospects) are non-existent for
college basketball players. Firms like 247, Scout and Rivals all have proprietary
algorithms that attempt to measure high school prospect ability. For the NBA, media
outlets like ESPN have analysts and senior writers that attempt to predict where a player
will be drafted, but detailed analysis on a player’s ability is relatively non-existent
(Nusser, 2013). This lack of information detracts from a perfect market existing for the
NBA draft and is possibly a cause for the errors mentioned in the previous section.
Interestingly, 247 even have a “Top247” for college football players but do not have
similar analysis for basketball. This gap in the rating agency market could possibly be an
opportunity for one of the top firms, or a new firm who addresses this unmet need.

CHAPTER THREE
Methodology

Research Overview
The genesis of this research was the “Preliminary Draft Analysis” where the
relationship between win-shares and draft position was examined. The “Preliminary Draft
Analysis” included a data set of fourteen draft classes and was compiled using
Basketball-Reference.com. The data set was expanded to include eighteen draft classes
spanning 1989 to 2006 for the “Career Analysis”. This analysis took career data for
multiple variables including compensation and ran regressions against win shares in the
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attempt to find key drivers of individual win contribution. From this expanded data set a
random sample of 35 players was taken to form a panel set. This “Panel Analysis”
allowed for the examination of different variables’ effects on win shares over the course
of a player’s career. From this analysis it became evident that the draft was of upmost
importance, so all observations at the first, fifteenth, thirtieth, forty-fifth and sixtieth draft
positions were taken from the master data set to examine the relationship between win
share production over time at varying draft spots.
Equations
The Win Share Model
Mentioned previously in the “Sports-Reference Model” section, win share
methodology was used for this research, in lieu of the Bill James model, due to the
additional complexity that allows for negative wins and encompasses more statistics that
are relevant to the game of basketball (NBA Win Shares).
To cover the Sports-Reference model in more detail, one must examine the two
formulas that feed the final result: Offensive Win Shares (OWS) and Defensive Win
Shares (DWS). OWS are calculated using Dean Oliver’s formulas for points produced
and offensive possessions. All of the following formulas can be found in the SportsReference Glossary (Basketball-Reference.com). The step-by-step method is outlined
below:
1)

Calculate “Points Produced” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula:
a) 𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 =
!"#$%&&'(

𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐹𝐺 + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴 𝑇 + 𝐹𝑇𝑀𝑎𝑑𝑒 × 1 − !"#$%&'()*+,'-- ×
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝐵𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡× 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦%) + 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑅𝐵
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2)

Calculate “Offensive Possessions” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula:
a) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝐹𝐺×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝐹𝑇×𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠

3)

Calculate “Marginal Offense” for each player:
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓 =
𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 − 0.92×(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)×(𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠)

4)

Calculate “Marginal Points per Win” for each player.
!"#$%#&"

a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 0.32×(𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒)×(!"#$%"&#'")
i) Where 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑒 = 48×(
5)

!"#$%&''!!""#$%%
!×

!"#$%&'()#*"+
!

)

Calculate “OWS” for each player:
a) 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑊𝑆 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑂𝑓𝑓/𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛

Next, DWS must be calculated and added, as the sum of OWS and DWS results in the
win share total for each player. This method is based partially on Dean Oliver’s
“Defensive Rating” statistic, which is an estimate of a player’s points allowed per 100
defensive possessions. The step-by-step method is outlined below:
1) Calculate the “Defensive Rating” for each player using Dean Oliver’s formula:
a) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔 = 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔 + 0.2×(100×𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠× 1 −
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑝% − 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑅𝑡𝑔)
2)

Calculate “Marginal Defense” for each player:
a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑓 =
!"#$%&'()!"#$%*
!"#$%&'()#*"+

3)

×𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠× 1.08×𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠 − (

!"#$%&

Calculate “Marginal Points per Win” for each player:
!"#$%#&"

a) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛 = 0.32×𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒×(!"#$!"#$%")
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!""

)

4)

Calculate “DWS” for each player:
a) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑊𝑆 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑓/𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑊𝑖𝑛
The sum of OWS and DWS can then be calculated to arrive at a win share total

for the respective player in question for any particular season.
WS/Season per Million Dollars
Wins-per-Million Dollars is an essential formula to this paper because it allows
one to analyze the relationship between individual player contribution and compensation.
As was stated in the “Basis of Research”, one goal of this paper is to identify players with
high win-contribution levels with minimal payroll burdens. To compute, the win shares
produced for a specific time period is divided by the compensation accrued over the same
time period, and then multiplied by one million. This equation is unique to this paper and
is an extension of the formula list provided above.
!"
!"#$%&

𝑝𝑒𝑟$1𝑀 = 𝑊𝑆/𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛×$1𝑀

(1)

CHAPTER FOUR
Career Analysis

Description of Purpose
The overarching goal of this paper was to create a risk/reward methodology that
aided NBA franchises in making rookie contract decisions. The first step in achieving the
stated goal was to identify the types of players who historically have been high win share
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contributors and determine whether there are shared characteristics between them. The
career analysis set out to determine key drivers of win shares by examining multiple
variables’ effect on player win-contribution, using career data. By expanding the
variables from solely focusing on draft position, this step expanded the scope of the
research and broadened its implications.
Data Summary
The data set for players drafted in the NBA between 1989 and 2006 originally
consisted of 1,022 individuals. However, for the purposes of this research, the data set
was parsed to 674 individuals who had at least played 82 games. This was done because
when examining win shares over a specific period of time, such as wins per season or
wins per 48 minutes, players who have only played a limited amount of games can skew
the statistic. Using this method, only players who had played an equivalent of one season
were included in the analysis. Of the 674 players, there were 120 point guards, 131
shooting guards, 130 small forwards, 138 power forwards and 153 centers.
Figure 2 - Career Analysis Data Set by Position

By Position
PG

17.8%

SG

19.4%

SF

19.3%

PF

20.5%

C

22.7%
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The following figure outlines the definitions for the variables gathered for the
career analysis.
Figure 3 - Career Analysis Variable Descriptions
Variable Descriptions
Name

Description

FG%

Field goal percentage for a player’s career.

FT%

Free throw percentage for a player’s career.

MPG

Average minutes played per game during a player’s career.

PPG

Average points per game during a player’s career.

TRB

Average total rebounds per game during a player’s career.

AST

Average assists per game during a player’s career.

Win Shares Win shares accumulated over a player’s career.
Salary

Dollars accumulated over a player’s career.

Pick

Position a player was selected in the draft.

The summary of the statistics gathered for the career analysis is listed below.
Figure 4 - Career Analysis Data Set Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics
Max

Mean

Median

Min

StDev

FG%

61.60%

44.70%

44.10%

30.30%

4.51%

FT%

91.00%

72.72%

73.90%

44.50%

8.92%

MPG

41.10

21.23

20.70

5.10

7.80

PPG

27.10

8.41

7.40

1.40

4.66

TRB

12.70

3.70

3.20

0.50

2.06

AST

9.90

1.80

1.30

-

1.56

WS

206.4

28.56246291

17.95

-1.6

33.40109394

Salary $389,250,042.60 $50,758,386.47 $29,714,351.40 $353,592.52 $58,005,977.30
Pick

23.68

22.67

22.31

22.01
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21.74

Regression Models
Salary on Win Shares
Results
(2)

𝑊𝑆 = 𝐵! + 𝐵! ×𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦

By running a regression of salary’s effect on win shares, one can see in Figure 6
that 82.40% of the variation in win shares is accounted for by salary. The model as a
whole is significant with an F-statistic result of 3,146.15. Additionally, salary is
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 56.09 and a p-value of 0. The relationship
between salary and win shares indicates that players who are paid more produce more
win shares for their respective organizations.
Figure 5 - Salary on Win Shares Results

Observations

674

F (1, 672)

3146.15

Adjusted R
Squared

82.40%

WS

Coefficient

Salary
Constant

5.23E-07
2.03

Std. Error
9.32E-09
0.72

t

P>(t)
56.09
2.83

0
0.005

95% Confidence
Interval
5.04E-07
5.41E-07
0.62
3.44

Findings
It seems there is a positive linear relationship between salary and win shares. The
following figure displays this relationship, however the majority of the observations are
located in the bottom left corner of the chart. This depiction shows that there is a talent
scarcity issue in the NBA, especially considering this data set includes player career
history from eighteen draft classes. The goal of drafting players and making sound team
option decisions then becomes more important, so that organizations can avoid capital
intensive processes of acquiring players through trades and free agency.
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Figure 6 - Salary & Win Share Relationship

0

1.0e+08

2.0e+08
Salary

3.0e+08

4.0e+08

Game Play on Win Shares
Results
𝑊𝑆 = 𝐵! + 𝐵! ×𝐹𝐺% + 𝐵! ×𝐹𝑇% + 𝐵! ×𝑃𝑃𝐺 + 𝐵! ×𝑇𝑅𝐵 + 𝐵! ×𝐴𝑆𝑇 + 𝐵! ×𝑀𝑃

(3)

Game play statistics were gathered for the analysis to determine if it is possible to
predict win-shares based on in game performance. This regression shows that the game
play statistics measured account for 72.08% of the variation in win shares. All of the
variables were statistically significant with large t-statistics and low p-values all below
0.01. Therefore, it is plausible to say that win shares can be predicted based on the game
play statistics, which provide insight on in-game performance. This makes sense because
the win share statistic is calculated using game play statistics. Although the win share
statistic at the base level is a combination of various advanced metrics, those advanced
metrics are composed of underlying game play statistics.
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Figure 7 - Game Play on Win Shares Results

Observations
F (6, 667)

674
286.93

Adjusted R
Squared
WS
FG%
FT%
PPG
TRB
AST
MP
Constant

72.08%

Coefficient
52.54
37.33
3.41
7.31
7.5
-0.92
-71.78

Std. Error
19.42
9.99
0.38
0.65
0.73
0.28
11.71

t

P>(t)
2.71
3.74
8.9
11.26
10.28
-3.28
-6.13

0.007
0
0
0
0
0.001
0

95% Confidence Interval
14.41
90.67
17.71
56.95
2.66
4.16
6.04
8.59
6.06
8.93
-1.47
-0.37
-94.78
-48.78

Career Analysis Discussion
The following figure reinforces the idea that high win share producers are a rare
commodity, as the large majority of observations produce close to zero win shares.

0

.01

Density
.02

.03

.04

Figure 8 - Win Share Distribution

0

50

100
WS

150

200

Examining win shares at a career level is important because it allows the
completion of two goal-necessary steps outlined in the “Basis of Research” : 1) High win
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share producers demand higher salaries 2) Win share production levels can be predicted
by game play statistics. However, NBA organizations form contracts with players that are
time bound. Additionally, said organizations compete to win championships on a yearby-year basis. Therefore, it is important to understand the dynamics of how win share
production levels fluctuate over the course of a player’s career. To examine this, panel
data is necessary.

CHAPTER FIVE
Initial Random Sample Analysis

Description of Purpose
Of the master data set, thirty-five players were randomly selected, representing
approximately 5% of the original sample. Seasonal data was collected for these players,
creating a panel data set. This panel data set was created to examine the impact of given
variables on win shares over the course of a player’s career. The master data set
essentially gives insight to the question: What do high win share producers look like?
While the panel data set attempts to answer: When can teams get a good deal on a high
win share producer?
Data Summary
The variables collected for the random sample analysis are described below. One
observation is equivalent to one year of data for a given player. Therefore, TRB through
PTS are variables that count totals during a given year, as opposed to per-game statistics
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that are commonly used when analyzing NBA players. The decision to use season totals
instead of seasonal per-game averages was largely made to match the data collected for
college players.
Figure 9 - Panel Analysis Variable Descriptions

Variable Descriptions
Name

Description

ID

The numerical identifier associated with a player’s data

Time

The year of the observation. For example, “1” would indicate a player’s rookie year

FG%

Field goal percentage for a given observation

TRB

Total rebounds for a given observation

AST

Total assists for a given observation

STL

Total steals for a given observation

BLK

Total blocks for a given observation

TOV

Total turnovers for a given observation

PF

Total personal fouls for a given observation

PTS

Total points for a given observation

Salary

Salary for a given observation

WS/Season

Win shares for a given observation

The summary of the panel data set is outlined below. As is expected from a
random sample, there is wide variation in virtually all of the variables seen through the
respective standard deviations.
Figure 10 - Panel Analysis Data Summary
Mean
ID

Summary Statistics
Std. Dev. Min

Max

18.14

10.21

1

35

Time

5.64

3.54

1

16

FG%

0.45

0.06

0.25

1

TRB

256.64

203.53

0

904

AST

96.15

94.91

0

619

STL

43.38

34.64

0

197

BLK

29.68

33.58

0

215

TOV

77.99

59.45

0

315

PF

129.52

76.91

0

371

PTS

548.63

414.63

2

1686

2.67

2.74

-0.8

12.7

4,495,457

4,478,880

224,018

22,800,000

Salary
WS/Season
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WS/Season per $1 Million
The figure below shows the average of win shares divided by salary, multiplied
by one million, for the entirety of the panel data set. Titled “Wins per $1 million” the
chart shows how many wins (Y-Axis) a player will, on average, contribute per $1 million
they receive in compensation over time (X-Axis). Essentially, players with high “Wins
per $1 million” statistics contribute more wins for lower cost than players with low
statistics. Interestingly, the chart peaks at year three. This finding indicates that players
contribute most, relative to their compensation, in the third year of their NBA career.
Rookie contracts include a team option for the third year, so players that have this option
exercised, on average, deliver more value than players not bound by a rookie contract
extension. This relationship is seen in the decline after the third year. Teams do have a
fourth year option with rookie contracts, so it is interesting not to see the peak in year
four.
The line roughly bottoms out between years eight and nine. To note, there is
possible survivorship bias to explain the spikes in later years, as the players who had
longer careers tended to be perennial all-stars.
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Figure 11 – WS/Season per $1 million

WS/Season per $1 million
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
Wins per $1 million

0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 1516

The following figure displays the information presented above, but by position for
the first five years. It is clear that the gap between production and compensation begins to
close after year three, since by year five all rookies are either no longer in the NBA or
have signed long term contracts. The only position to not follow the trend is power
forward, as the average of WS/Season per $1 million for power forwards in the random
sample increases in year five. However, the N size for power forwards is only nine and
by year five only four players remained in the NBA. Therefore, the high win share
production of former perennial all-star Shawn Kemp influences the attribution. In fact,
Kemp contributed over seven win shares in year five, while the remaining three power
forwards did not even have one win share.
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Figure 12 - Random Panel WS/Season per $1M by Position

3.00
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2.00
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Initial Random Sample Discussion
The initial analysis of the panel data sought to answer: When can teams get a
good deal on a high win share producer? Realizing players contribute the most win shares
for the lowest cost in the option years of their rookie contracts, NBA organizations
should try hardest to identify high win share producers before they enter the NBA.
Acquiring talent early in their career post-draft is difficult due to the low risk NBA teams
exert by taking on a player with minimal costs for two years. The following section
outlines two analyses that examine how draft position affects win shares over an entire
career and how differences in draft position affect win shares at varying career intervals.
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CHAPTER SIX
Draft Analysis

Summary
As shown through the “Initial Random Sample Analysis” players are most
valuable in terms of win production levels in the team option years (three and four) of
their rookie contracts. By selecting players in the draft who are predicted to be high win
share producers, teams have the potential of high production for low cost in years three
and four. This potential comes at a low risk as teams can discard of underperforming
players after year two.
Preliminary Draft Analysis
Description of Purpose
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the relationship between draft
position and career win shares and show whether or not players drafted earlier contribute
more wins over their respective careers.
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Data Summary
The variables collected for this data set are defined below:
Figure 13 - Preliminary Draft Analysis Variable Description

Name
Pick
PickSq
Avg. Salary
Career Length
Games
Avg. Games
Minutes
Avg. Minutes
WinShares
WinShares/48
College
Foreign

Variable Descriptions
Description
Draft position in which a player was selected
Draft position squared
The quotient of career compensation and years played
Number of years played in a career
Number of games played in a career
The quotient of number of games played and number of years played
Number of minutes played in a career
The quotient of number of minutes played and number of games played
The number of wins attributed to a single player in a career
The number of wins attributed to a single player per 48 minutes played
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a player went to college
Dummy variable indicating whether or not a player originated from a foreign country

This data set features data from Basketball-Reference.com, including all players
drafted from 1989 to 2002. Some observations are missing data for certain variables, such
as “Games” and “WinShares”, as some players who are drafted do not play a complete
season in the NBA (if at all). Therefore, the regression ran using this data set only had
625 observations, as opposed to the total 728 observations.
Figure 14 - Preliminary Draft Analysis Data Summary

Pick
Avg Salary
Career Length
Games
Avg Games

Observations
728
728
625
625
728

Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation
29
16
2970386
3540878
8
5
427
363
40
24

Minimum
1
0
1
1
0

Maximum
58
2.02E+07
21
1462
78.53

Minutes

624

10697

11686

3

50418

Avg Minutes

626

18.32

9.08

0

41.1

WinShares

625

22.49

32.7

-1.6

206.4

College

728

0.91

0.28

0

1

Foreign

728

0.07

0.26

0

1
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Regression Model: Pick on Win Shares
Results
𝑊𝑆 = 𝐵! + 𝐵! ×𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘 + 𝐵! ×𝑃𝑖𝑐𝑘 !

(4)

The figure below highlights the polynomial relationship between “Pick” and
“WinShares”, which provided the justification for including the “PickSq” variable.
Figure 15 - Win Shares & Pick Relationship

Figure 16 - Pick on Win Share Results

Observations

625

F (2, 622)

126.06

Prob > F

0

Adjusted R
Squared
WS
Pick
PickSq
Constant

28.61%

Coefficient
-2.994
0.037
66.62

Std Error
0.274
0.005
3.25

t
-10.92
7.52
20.49
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P>|t|
0
0
0

95% Confidence Interval
-3.533
-2.456
0.0269
0.0461
60.235
73.006

This regression analyzes the relationship between draft position and career winshares. The model as a whole is significant due to the F-statistic of 126.06. All variables
are statistically significant and “Pick” seems to be practically significant because a oneunit increase in draft numerical value results in three less wins contributed by the player.
For example, the model suggests a player selected first would contribute almost 64 wins
throughout his career, while the player selected last overall would only contribute
roughly 17 wins. The R-Squared for this model is 28.84%, indicating that the position a
player is selected does not account for the entire variation in win shares. Despite the low
R-Squared figure, the model still provides important insight on the relationship.
Findings
The figure below depicts the percentage of players for a specific draft position
(over the 14 drafts in which data was collected) who contributed more wins than the
regression model predicted. Outperformance was determined by examining the residuals
of the regression analysis. Picks one through five outperformed the model at least 50% of
the time, while the only other lottery pick to post similar outperformance was pick 13.
However, when put into the perspective of the entire draft, picks 21 and 37 were the only
picks outside the lottery to outperform the model at least 50% of the time. Therefore,
75% of the draft positions that had a majority of players outperform their predicted win
share totals were within the draft lottery, giving credence to the lottery itself.
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Figure 17 - Pick on Win Shares Residuals

Percent of Picks with Higher Win Shares vs. Model Prediction
Pick 1

54%

Pick 15

38%

Pick 30

46%

Pick 45

23%

Pick 2

62%

Pick 16

46%

Pick 31

15%

Pick 46

15%

Pick 3

54%

Pick 17

46%

Pick 32

23%

Pick 47

38%

Pick 4

54%

Pick 18

31%

Pick 33

15%

Pick 48

23%

Pick 5

54%

Pick 19

31%

Pick 34

23%

Pick 49

15%

Pick 6

15%

Pick 20

23%

Pick 35

15%

Pick 50

0%

Pick 7

15%

Pick 21

69%

Pick 36

8%

Pick 51

8%

Pick 8

31%

Pick 22

23%

Pick 37

54%

Pick 52

15%

Pick 9

38%

Pick 23

46%

Pick 38

23%

Pick 53

8%

Pick 10

46%

Pick 24

38%

Pick 39

23%

Pick 54

15%

Pick 11

38%

Pick 25

23%

Pick 40

23%

Pick 55

0%

Pick 12

8%

Pick 26

31%

Pick 41

31%

Pick 56

0%

Pick 13

62%

Pick 27

31%

Pick 42

15%

Pick 57

14%

Pick 14

23%

Pick 28

38%

Pick 43

46%

Pick 58

0%

Pick 29

31%

Pick 44

15%

Draft Position Analysis
Description of Purpose
Knowing that players are paid least for production in the early years of their
career, and that teams subsequently must draft well, this analysis seeks to examine
whether a relationship exists between where a player is drafted and the win shares they
produce over the course of their career. The dataset for this analysis is a subset of the
dataset collected for the “Career Analysis”, using all first, fifteenth, thirtieth, forty-fifth
and sixtieth draft selections made over the course of the eighteen drafts from 1989 to
2006. However, this dataset was converted from career data to season-by-season data for
win share and salary statistics to create a panel data set.
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Data Summary
The descriptions of the variables are listed below. Important to note is the “Last”
variable, which signifies players drafted last in their respective draft. The last pick
number varied throughout the data collected from 1989 to 2006 due to NBA expansion.
Figure 18 - Draft Position Variable Descriptions

Variable Descriptions
Name

Description

Time

Describes the season of a player’s career (1 represents a rookie season)

WS/Season

Describes the win shares produced per season

Salary/Season

Describes compensation per season

First

Describes players drafted first overall

Fifteenth

Describes players drafted in the fifteenth position

Thirtieth

Describes players drafted in the thirtieth position

Forty-Fifth

Describes players drafted in the forty-fifth position

Last

Describes players drafted last overall

The summary of the data is shown below. There seems to be great variation in
win shares among observations. Also, as a consequence of later draft picks being more
likely to not have an NBA career (or shorter careers in general), the dataset was skewed
toward earlier picks in terms of observations.
Figure 19 - Draft Position Data Summary

Summary Statistics
Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Time

625

6.48

4.15

1

19

Pick

625

18.56

17.94

1

60

WS/Season

625

3.95

4.03

-1.2

20.3

Salary/Season

625

7,112,345

7,070,432

28,751.5

40,300,000

First

625

0.39

0.49

0

1

Fiftienth

625

0.23

0.42

0

1

Thirtieth

625

0.19

0.39

0

1

Forty-Fifth

625

0.15

0.36

0

1

Last

625

0.04

0.20

0

1
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Regression Model: Draft Position on WS/Season
A panel regression was run for this analysis, setting Player ID (a numerical value
assigned to each player for identification, not analysis, purposes) and Time for the panel.
A fixed effect was not used due to dummy variables being created manually for the pick
groups. The first overall picks were left out of the regression to be used as the
comparison group.
Results
𝑊𝑆
= 𝐵! + 𝐵! ×𝐹𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑡ℎ + 𝐵! ×𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑡ℎ + 𝐵! ×𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑦 − 𝐹𝑖𝑓𝑡ℎ
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐵! ×𝐿𝑎𝑠𝑡

(5)

The figure below displays the results from the draft position regression. While the
r-squared value is low, with only 16.33% of the variation in win shares explained by the
draft groups, it is important to note that all of the variables were extremely statistically
and practically significant. Interestingly, the coefficients on the “Fifteenth”, “Thirtieth
and “Forty-Fifth” variables are all relatively similar. Therefore a player drafted 15th, 30th
or 45th in the draft should perform similarly to one another compared to players drafted
first overall, ceteris paribus. The average for WS/Season in the dataset was 3.95. Using
the regression model, it is impossible to arrive at a WS/Season statistic equal to, or above,
the average. With the mean win shares for first overall picks at 5.92, it is clear that the
comparison group skewed the overall dataset.
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Figure 20 - Draft Position Regression Results

Observations

625

Groups
Adjusted R
Squared
WS/Season
Fifteenth
Thirtieth
Forty-Fifth
Last
Constant

79
16.33%

Coefficient
-3.40
-3.62
-3.63
-4.87
5.63

Std Error
0.69
0.72
0.74
1.06
0.47

z
-4.91
-5.04
-4.91
-4.60
12.05

P>|z|
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

95% Confidence Interval
-4.76
-2.04
-5.03
-2.21
-5.08
-2.18
-6.94
-2.80
4.71
6.54

Findings
The regression may not have shown that draft position is a large determinant of
win shares, however it does lend credence to the findings of the “Preliminary Draft
Analysis”. That model showed that outside the first few picks, there are relatively few
positions that outperform predicted win share levels historically. This model shows that
there is relative parity among all of the draft groups except the “Last” group when
comparing performance to first overall picks. Essentially, this means that high win share
producers are most likely found at the top of the draft, but can be found throughout the
draft and picks outside the lottery are all roughly similar in value. Do NBA teams
currently act accordingly to the results of this regression? It is hard to say with certainty,
as historical draft moves are not formally documented. However, in the 2017 draft there
were six moves made to either buy into or shift position in the second round (NBA.com,
2017). This activity runs contrast to the data provided above, as picks outside the first
fourteen are relatively equal.
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Draft Discussion
The “Initial Random Sample Analysis” provided evidence that players produce
more win shares per million dollars during the early years of their career. The way teams
acquire rookies is through the draft. Hence, a logical follow up question is: Where are
high win share producers historically selected in the draft? The “Preliminary Draft
Analysis” displayed that, outside the first five selections, players drafted at nearly all
other draft positions did not outperform the model in terms of win shares historically.
Therefore, the model seems to show that the first five draft picks are positions where high
win share producers have been selected historically.
Additionally, the “Draft Position Analysis” provided evidence that first overall
picks, when compared to the remaining draft groups, do produce more win shares.
However, the middle three draft groups (15th, 30th and 45th) perform similarly when
compared to first overall picks, meaning that if teams do not secure a lottery pick, it is not
essential to “move up” in the draft and forfeit assets like veterans or future draft picks.
While teams are greatly benefited by superstar players that contribute outlier win share
statistics, it is also necessary for teams to round out rosters with players who routinely
provide positive win shares.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Secondary Random Sample Analysis

Description of Purpose
The “Draft Analysis” showed that high win share producers are historically
selected earlier in the draft, however teams do not perennially have a top five or even top
fifteen pick. Therefore, it is important to understand how to make sound draft selections
with later picks. To accomplish the stated task, it is important to understand how to
predict player win production levels using only data available during a player’s collegiate
career. Additionally, once a player is drafted, determining whether to exercise team
options in years three and four is essential to the talent management process of NBA
organizations. Using the random sample described in the “Initial Random Sample
Analysis” three regressions were executed to accomplish the aforementioned goals.
Regression Models
Panel Data Regression
The random sample was used in its entirety for the panel regression. This
regression was run to show whether or not in-game statistics are sound predictors of win
shares per season when analyzed on a season-by-season basis. The variable descriptions
and data summary for this regression can be found within the “Initial Random Sample
Analysis” section of this paper. A fixed effects panel regression was run for this analysis,
setting player id and time for the panel.
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Results
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(6)

The variables selected account for 73.76% of win shares per season. All of the
variables are statistically significant with large t values and P values of zero or near zero.
The most practically significant variable is FG% because a one percentage point increase
in FG% yields 5.404 more win shares per season holding all else constant. This finding
lends to the idea that efficient players have higher win shares, due to the minimization of
activities that are detrimental to their teams, such as missing attempted shots.
Figure 21 – Panel Regression Results

Observations

292

Groups
Adjusted R
Squared
WS/Season

35
73.76%

Coefficient

Std. Error

FG%

5.006

1.261

3.97

0.000

2.5218

7.4900

TRB

0.003

0.001

2.63

0.009

0.0007

0.0049

AST

0.005

0.002

2.61

0.010

0.0013

0.0096

STL

0.012

0.006

1.94

0.053

-0.0002

0.0240

BLK

0.012

0.004

2.77

0.006

0.0034

0.0204

TOV

-0.016

0.005

-3.50

0.001

-0.0255

-0.0071

PF

-0.008

0.002

-3.12

0.002

-0.0125

-0.0028

0.005

0.001

7.15

0.000

0.0036

0.0064

-2.163

0.549

-3.94

0.000

-3.2436

-1.0825

PTS
Constant

t

P>(t)

95% Confidence Interval

Findings
This model is a better representation of the relationship between in-game statistics
and win shares than “Game Play on Win Shares” displayed in the career analysis,
although it reaffirms the findings. Intuitively, because the win share statistic is built off of
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in-game statistics, it makes sense that in-game statistics would be good predictors of win
production levels.
College Data Regression
For the college data regression, only the last year of college data prior to a player
entering the NBA draft was used. Additionally, the win shares per season for the rookie
year observations were used as the Y variable, to determine whether or not college ingame statistics can determine rookie production levels. This regression is significant
because NBA organizations must draft well to maximize production compared to cost of
roster talent as seen in the “WS/Season per $1 Million” analysis.
Data Summary
Of the thirty-five players included in the panel regression, only thirty-three
players were used in this model, as two of the observations did not attend college. Since
this model includes two fewer observations, an additional data summary is provided
below for accuracy. All variable descriptions remain the same from those assigned in the
“Initial Random Sample Analysis”. “TOV” and “PF” were not included in the model for
college data as many players were missing this information, indicating that turnovers and
personal fouls are statistics that have not been tracked in college basketball until recently.
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Figure 22 - College Data Summary

Summary Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

FG

0.4936

0.0493

0.42

0.65

TRB

219.85

73.57

78

352

AST

82.18

64.11

9

299

STL

44.06

27.08

5

111

BLK

33.88

34.27

0

156

PTS

567.82

145.52

135

818

WS/Season Rookie

0.88

1.22

-0.50

4.60
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The regression results below indicate that college in-game statistics do not
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account for any of the variation in rookie win shares when viewing adjusted r-squared.
None of the variables were statistically or practically significant.
Figure 23 - College Data Regression Results

Observations
F (9, 23)
Adj. R-Squared

33
0.34
-14.22%

WS/Season Rookie

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t

P>(t)

95% Confidence Interval

FG

0.609

5.524

0.11

0.913

-10.75

11.96

TRB

-0.003

0.005

-0.70

0.488

-0.01

0.01

AST

0.003

0.006

0.49

0.630

-0.01

0.02

STL

-0.017

0.015

-1.12

0.273

-0.05

0.01

BLK

0.005

0.009

0.60

0.553

-0.01

0.02

PTS

0.001

0.002

0.41

0.687

0.00

0.01

Constant

1.150

2.772

0.4

0.682

-4.55

6.85

Findings
Although the regression did not yield significant results, the model shows that ingame statistics for the last year of collegiate play are not a sound indicator of rookie win
share totals. Examining more than one year of collegiate play could be beneficial,
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however a large share of drafted players only play one year of college basketball. This
model does not factor in the conference a college player was in, nor their team’s strength
of schedule, as Alexander Greene did in his model. These two data points are important,
as there is disparity among conferences and schedules in college basketball. While
Greene’s model aimed to look at different relationships, including more qualitative data
for the college observations may improve this model. Understanding that drafting well is
important in taking advantage of the most productive years of a player’s career in terms
of wins per million dollars, it seems NBA organizations must find other ways of
determining rookie win share totals from data available for collegiate athletes.
Despite the shortcomings of this model, examining whether third year win shares
can be determined by data available for rookies is still mission critical. The following
model seeks to answer this, moving closer toward the overarching goal of the paper,
which is to determine whether NBA organizations can make better decisions regarding
rookie contracts in option years by analyzing win shares.
Rookie Data Regression
For the rookie data regression, only the year one observations for each player in
the random sample were used. Additionally, the win shares for third year observations
were used as the Y variable, to determine whether or not rookie in-game statistics can
determine third year production levels. This regression is significant because NBA
organizations must make decisions regarding third year team options for rookies before
the start of the second season. Therefore, teams are making these decisions based solely
on rookie data.
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Data Summary
Of the thirty-five players selected for the random sample, only thirty-three played
three or more seasons and therefore only thirty-three observations are found in this
regression. Since the observations for this regression were altered from the original
model, a new data summary was generated for accuracy. The variable names all remain
valid from the “Initial Random Sample Analysis”.
Figure 24 - Rookie Data Summary

Summary Statistics
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

FG

0.4361

0.0597

0.29

0.57

TRB

160.94

135.48

4

391

AST

50.58

52.21

3

205

STL

25.45

20.69

0

78

BLK

24.94

38.09

0

163

TOV

56.45

46.31

2

163

PF

98.97

76.96

0

230

PTS

330.91

292.01

23

1142

WS/Season Rookie

0.911

1.237

-0.50

4.60

WS/Season Year 3

2.855

2.874

-0.30

11.30

Salary (Rookie)

1,837,976

1,028,515

507,239.30

4,759,380

Results
!"
!"#$!!"#$%&

= = 𝐵! + 𝐵! ×𝐹𝐺 + 𝐵! ×𝑇𝑅𝐵 + 𝐵! ×𝐴𝑆𝑇 + 𝐵! ×𝑆𝑇𝐿 + 𝐵! ×
!"

𝐵𝐿𝐾 + 𝐵! ×𝑃𝑇𝑆 + 𝐵! × !""#$%&%'(") + 𝐵! ×𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑒𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦

(8)

As seen in the figure below, the variables used in the regression account for
45.20% of the variation in win shares per season. Therefore, rookie data only accounts
for roughly 30% of win shares produced in a player’s third season. The R-Squared for
this regression was 62.33% so it seems the regression is being penalized for including too
many variables.
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“FG” seems to be practically significant but not statistically significant, as the tstatistic and p-value are not significant, but an increase of one percentage point in field
goal percentage in a player’s rookie season yields 6.92 more win shares in a player’s third
season. Interestingly, “PF” seems to be statistically significant, alluding to the fact that
players who commit less personal fouls in their rookie season produce more win shares in
their third season. In fact, the variable seems to hold practical significance, as the mean in
the data summary is 98 personal fouls. The average personal foul total would yield 3.64
win shares less in a player’s third season, which is greater than the standard deviation for
win shares. “PTS” is statistically significant but not practically significant, as the
coefficient is negative. Since the team with more points wins, it is unrealistic that scoring
more points in a rookie season would result in less win shares in a third season. A
possible explanation to this result is that players who excel in their rookie season are
defended with more urgency in subsequent seasons. “WS/Season Rookie” seems to be
statistically significant with a t-statistic above two and a p value near zero. The variable
also seems to be practically significant as one additional win share in a player’s rookie
season produces roughly 1.5 more win shares in a player’s third season holding all else
constant.
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Figure 25 - Rookie Data Regression Results

Observations
F (9, 23)
Adj. R-Squared

33
3.64
45.20%

WS/Season Year 3

Coefficient

Std. Err.

t

P>(t)

95% Confidence Interval

FG

6.92477

7.881

0.88

0.389

-9.420

23.269

TRB

0.00057

0.012

0.05

0,964

-0.026

0.027

AST

-0.00062

0.022

-0.03

0.978

-0.047

0.046

STL

0.03929

0.057

0.68

0.501

-0.080

0.159

BLK

0.00773

0.017

0.46

0.652

-0.027

0.043

TOV

0.09750

0.053

1.82

0.082

-0.014

0.209

PF

-0.03710

0.014

-2.58

0.017

-0.067

-0.007

PTS

-0.01226

0.006

-2.00

0.058

-0.025

0.000

WS/Season Rookie

1.48867

0.549

2.71

0.013

0.350

2.628

Salary (Rookie)

1.06E-06

5.59E-07

1.90

0.071

-9.79E-08

2.22E-06

Constant

-2.07071

3.427

-0.60

0.552

-9.179

5.037

Findings
The regression may not account for all the variation in year three win shares, but
it does yield interesting results. Needing an F statistic of 2.32 to be significant, the result
of 3.64 shows that the overall model is statistically significant. “WS/Season Rookie” was
both statistically and practically significant showing that win shares produced in a
player’s rookie season are a good indicator of year three win shares. Additionally, “PF”
was both statistically and practically significant and was negative, alluding to an inverse
relationship between rookie personal fouls and year three win shares. This relationship
makes sense and its significance shows that teams should observe how controlled a
player is on the court. However, this regression is not a perfect model. The model does
not account for all of the variation in year three. One reason could be win shares are the
learning curve between college and the professional level. Players who do not perform
well in their rookie season could excel by year three. Those who outperform in their
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rookie season may see opponents adjust and face increased competition by their third
year.
The figure below shows the relationship between rookies’ win-shares and winshares in year three.

0

WS/Season Year 3
5

10

Figure 26 - WS/Season Rookie & WS/Season Year 3 Relationship
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WS/Season

Secondary Random Sample Discussion
It is evident through the results of the panel regression that in-game statistics
correlate with win shares over the course of a player’s career. However, using the same
statistics from college do not seem to show the same relationship with win shares for
players during their rookie season. Interestingly, using the same in-game statistics with
the addition of rookie win shares and rookie salary seem to give some indication of year
three win shares. The last point is of most importance to this paper, as the relationship
between in-game statistics and year three win shares show that NBA organizations can
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make better judgments about the team options in rookie contracts by examining similar
data.
By incorporating win shares per one million dollars analysis, teams can then
determine whether a player is contributing production that exceeds their cost. While
teams do not have much leeway in what a player’s third year salary is, due to rookie
contract constraints, they do have flexibility in the qualifying offer extended after a
player’s fourth year. Since the qualifying offer must be made before the beginning of the
fourth year, teams must decide what the player is worth in terms of compensation after
year three. Therefore, understanding the projection of a player’s development in terms of
wins contributed through their first three years is vital in determining the dollar value to
assign to a qualifying offer at the end of a player’s third year.

CHAPTER EIGHT
Conclusion & Further Research
Conclusion
This paper finds that efficiency variables such as field goal percentage and proxy
variables for self-control, like personal fouls, serve as sound predictors of future win
share production. Through analysis of win shares versus compensation, it is found that
players are typically paid in accordance to their production level, except when
constrained by a rookie contract. Therefore, drafting seems to be a better solution than
free agency or trades in locating high win share producers. Unfortunately, in-game
statistics that serve as relatively good predictors of win share levels in the NBA are not
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good predictors when collegiate data is used. However, analysis of the draft shows that
high win share producers are typically found in earlier selections.
Further Research
Further research could focus on finding a method to predict win shares for players
entering the draft using data available on the collegiate level. Succeeding on this front
would allow for perfect information in the draft market and eliminate errors like the
Michael Jordan incident. NBA organizations are ultimately profit seeking firms and
minimizing risks that result in sunk costs is highly beneficial. Additionally, further
research could seek to examine adequate compensation levels for qualifying offers based
on data available in the first three years of a player’s career. This analysis would show
how NBA teams can take the team option analysis a step further and not overpay to keep
talent, effectively eliminating the drop off in win shares per million dollars. Finally, from
a different perspective, further research could take analysis from this paper relating to the
disparity in production versus compensation under rookie contracts, along with the
research in the “Joshi Analysis” to determine rational changes for the next collective
bargaining agreement. It certainly is not in the best interest of players for this gap in
production and compensation to exist, and therefore seems like an area for other
researchers to examine. However, as long as this gap persists, NBA franchises should
seek to exploit it to maximize seasonal wins and, in turn, attempts at championships as
post season success seems to be the leading determinant in short and long term economic
growth for organizations.
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